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ARGUMENT
In addition to those arguments set forth in Appellant's Brief, Appellant (hereinafter
"Petitioner") argues the following points in reply to the arguments set forth in Appellee's
Brief:
L

THE REQUESTED DISCOVERY IS NOT DISCOVERABLE
UNDER RULE 26 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN PROTECTED BY
THE TRIAL COURT.

Respondent argues that the broad scope of discovery established in Rule 26 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure gave license to the trial court to order disclosure of the
controversial information. However, because the trial court misinterpreted controlling case
law that would have effectively limited the scope of discoverable information, the trial court
abused its discretion in ordering the disclosure of what should have been classified as
irrelevant information under Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The scope of discovery is not without its limitations. Rule 26(b)(1) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure defines the scope of discovery thus:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates
to the claim or defense or the party seeking discovery or to the clam or defense
of any other party...It is not ground for objection that the information sought
will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, only information that is "relevant to the subject matter" and, if not
admissible itself, "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence" is
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properly discoverable. These requirements are important limits placed upon the discovering
party that should not be viewed lightly. Discovery is not a license to pry into a person's life
and expose irrelevant information:
The use of discovery should not be extended to permit ferreting unduly into
detail, nor to have the effect of cross-examining the opposing party or his
witnesses. Nor should it be distorted into a 'fishing expedition' in the hope
that something may be uncovered. It should be confined within the proper
limits of enabling the parties to find out essential facts for its legitimate
objective[.]
State exrelRd. Comm'n v. Petty, 412 P.2d 914, 918 (Utah 1966).
In the instant case, Respondent's request for intimate details of Petitioner's predivorce sexual life dating back to 1979 looks more like a harassing "fishing expedition" than
a legitimate request for discoverable information. As is discussed in detail in Appellate's
Brief, the controversial information sought by Respondent should not be admissible at a trial
in this matter under the Hogge-Becker test, even when that test is tempered by the correct
application of Elmer and its progeny.
Petitioner concedes that under Rule 26(b)( 1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
inadmissibility of the requested evidence at trial is no defense to its disclosure, but only so
long as such disclosure is "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence." It is inconceivable that Petitioner's disclosure of the controversial information
sought by Respondent would lead Respondent to any admissible evidence. Any evidence
garnered by a hypothetical disclosure of Petitioner's alleged pre-divorce extra-marital sexual
activities should also be deemed inadmissible under a proper application of the Hogge2

Becker test.
In addition to the reasonable conclusions that the requested discovery would itself be
inadmissible under the proper application of the Hogge-Becker test, and that disclosure of
the requested discovery would not lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, it is also
apparent that the requested discovery is not "relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending litigation." The subject matter of this action is of a limited scope. The strictures of
the Hogge-Becker test, and in particular its requirement that a motion for change of custody
must be premised upon a material change in circumstances since the latest order regarding
custody, considerably narrows the scope and time frame of the relevant issues and facts in
this action to those occurring after the parties' latest stipulated modification. The nature of
the action and the authoritative law pertaining thereto should define the "subject matter
involved in the lending litigation." In this case, the authoritative case law, as explained in
Appellant's Brief, is clear that the subject matter of this litigation should be confined to
activities occurring after the parties' most recent stipulated modification. Thus, requests for
discovery of information outside of those parameters are improper, as they are not "relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation."
Thus, under the plain language of Rule 26(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
the requested discovery would have been protected by the trial court had the trial court
properly interpreted Elmer and its progeny. The trial court's mistaken interpretation of
controlling case law, however, led the court to improperly broaden the scope of the "subject
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matter involved in the pending litigation.'' As is more fully discussed below, by basing its
decision on an inaccurate interpretation of controlling case law, the trial court abused its
discretion in ordering disclosure of the irrelevant information.
n.

BY BASING ITS DECISION ON AN INACCURATE
INTERPRETATION OF CONTROLLING CASE LAW, THE
TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING
DISCLOSURE OF THE ERRELEVANT INFORMATION.

Respondent argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion since no evidence
was admitted. Admittedly, Respondent bases this argument on Petitioner's unfortunate and
inaccurate choice of words on page 28 of Appellant's Brief.

Of course Petitioner

understands that the trial court did not actually admit evidence by ordering the disclosure of
the requested discovery. Semantics aside, however, Respondent is still incorrect. Trial
courts can and have abused their admittedly considerable discretion by allowing the
discovery of irrelevant information:
Although trial courts have broad discretion in matters of discovery, the trial
court, in exercising such discretion, must apply the correct law to its findings
of fact, and its findings of fact must be supported by sufficient evidence. An
appellate court will not find abuse of discretion absent an erroneous conclusion
of law or where there is no evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling. See
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1994) (while appellate courts always
decide what the law is, deference may be given to trial court's application of
law to the facts); accord Brown v. Superior Court, 137 Ariz. 327, 670 P.2d
725, 729-30 (1983) (trial court discretion in discovery matters "includes the
right to decide controverted factual issues, to draw inferences where
conflicting inferences are possible and to weigh competing interests. It does
not include the privilege of incorrect application of law or a decision
predicated upon irrational bases.").
Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469,472 (Utah 1996). Trial courts abuse their discretion when
4

they base discovery decisions on erroneous conclusions of law, and/or an insufficient
evidentiary basis. In the instant case, the trial court's misinterpretation and misapplication
of Elmer led to an abuse of discretion that should be corrected by this Court. The trial court's
decision was based upon an erroneous conclusion of law and an insufficient evidentiary
basis.
III.

THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE IS PROPERLY
CONSIDERED UNDER RULE 26 OF THE UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.

Respondent argues that the admissibility or inadmissibility of the requested evidence
is properly considered only at a trial in this matter, and not at the discovery phase of
litigation. Respondent is correct that admissibility questions are properly considered during
trial, but that is not the exclusive setting for such determinations.
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure delineates baseline minimum
requirements for the discovery of potentially irrelevant information. As is discussed above,
the potential admissibility of requested discovery, or at least that of evidence stemming from
the requested discovery, is in fact one of the baseline requirements under Rule 26. The trial
court must make some kind of preliminary assessment of the potential admissibility or
inadmissibility of evidence when confronted with a motion for protective order. The trial
court's preliminary assessment of the potential admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence
ought to be informed by correct principals of law pertaining to the nature of the action, in this
case a child custody modification. Due to the trial court's erroneous interpretation of Elmer,
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however, its decision to deny Petitioner' s Motion for Protective Order was not thus informed,
and should be reversed.
Contrary to Respondent's assertions. Petitioner is not arguing that Respondent should
be required to prove his case before he can have access to the requested information.
Petitioner is merely attempting to hold Respondent and the trial court to the minimum
baseline requirements outlined in Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the
discovery of potentially irrelevant and harmful information. This is especially important
considering the nature of the requested information and the conceivably insidious effects the
requested disclosure could have upon the parties' children and the Petitioner's life. Petitioner
is merely trying to protect her children and herself by preventing the legally unwarranted
disclosure of irrelevant, inadmissible, and potentially harmful information.
Respondent asserts that the requested information is essential to prove a material
change in circumstances. First, if the information is irrelevant and subject to protection
under Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Respondent is not entitled to access it
no matter what the reason.
Second, the Hogge-Becker test and its progeny require Respondent to prove a material
change in circumstances since the entry of the most recent order regarding child custody.
There is no apparent need for information pertaining to circumstances existing before the
parties' most recent modification, much less information dating back to 1979.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and those set forth in Appellant's Brief, and in the interests
of justice, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court reverse the interlocutory order of
the trial court entered in this matter on August 12, 2002, insofar as it directs Petitioner to
respond to Respondent's Interrogatories regarding Petitioner's alleged pre-divorce extramarital activities. Additionally, Petitioner requests that this Court grant Petitioner her
attorney's fees and costs as allowable under applicable law.
DATED this ^ day of June, 2003.
Respectfully Submitted,
CHRISTOPHERSON, FARRIS, WHITE & UTLEY, P.C.

Eric R. Gentry,
Attomd^foif
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